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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the impact of public debt level and (un)sustainability on fiscal spending 
effectiveness in Croatia. Public debt sustainability is analyzed using standard indicators of fiscal 
vulnerability and fiscal stability, accompanied with identification of regime changes in the 
public debt trajectory. Public debt sustainability analysis is used to analyze trends and 
tendencies, as well as to indicate periods of fiscal unsustainability in Croatia in period from 
2001 to 2015. Using switching regression and SVAR approach it is also empirically tested how 
public debt level affects the effectiveness of fiscal policy in Croatia in the same period. Results 
show a negative impact of recession on public debt sustainability and confirm the main thesis 
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1. Introduction 
 
Croatia is one of the EU countries with the highest level of public debt. The main reason for 
such fiscal stance can be found in the extensive deficit financing, especially during recent 
economic crisis. Croatia also had the longest recession period in EU that lasted for six 
consecutive years (2009-14). 
 
Public debt level is one of major structural determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness. Dynamic 
effects of fiscal policy are usually measured by the size of fiscal multipliers. It is hard to directly 
assess the effects of public debt on the size of fiscal multipliers, but generally a higher debt 
levels imply lower fiscal multipliers and lower fiscal policy effectiveness. The main 
mechanisms could be explained through the effects of risk assessment and confidence. High 
levels of public debt, especially in the recessionary environment, usually imply lower credit 
rating and higher risk spreads. That lead to a higher level of interest rates on government debt, 
which directly and indirectly “spill over” into higher interest rates for private sector, thus 
discouraging private consumption and investment (Batini et al, 2014). Another channel goes 
through expectations as consumers and corporate sector can expect that increased spending or 
tax cuts at higher levels of public debt will eventually lead to higher taxes and/or spending cuts, 
they restrain from spending/investing (Ricardian equivalence).  
 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of the public debt level and its 
(un)sustainability on the fiscal policy effectiveness in Croatia in period 2001-15.1 In the first 
part of the paper, a simple public debt sustainability indicators i.e. static stability indicator were 
used to distinguish periods when the Croatian public debt became unsustainable and could 
affect the fiscal policy effectiveness. Empirical identification of the breakpoints and regime 
changes suggested that unsustainability of the public debt in Croatia occurred with recession, 
i.e. after 2008Q4 (see Appendix 2). 
 
Taking that into account, in the empirical part of the paper two approaches are used to test 
public debt impact on fiscal policy effectiveness. In the first part of the empirical analysis, a 
switching regression approach is used to distinguish different regimes when government 
spending, i.e. fiscal policy has more or less impact on economic growth, regarding different 
cycle. In the second part, the structural VAR model is used to analyze the dynamic effects of 
government spending on domestic demand in Croatia. To observe the public debt effects on a 
fiscal policy, a “closed” model is compared with an “extended” model which includes debt-to-
GDP indicators. Detailed methodological explanations are given later in the paper. 
 
                                                                        
1 Empirical papers regarding impact of public debt on fiscal policy effectiveness are rather scarce for Croatia. Only one paper, 
using SVAR, is found where structural characteristics like trade openness and public debt level are used to analyze fiscal 
multipliers in Croatia along with Slovenia and Serbia (see Deskar-Škrbić & Šimović, 2017). Regarding analysis of public debt 
sustainability, there are many papers which deal with certain types of public debt sustainability issues. The most common are 
static analyses of stability indicators (for example Mihaljek, 2003; Sopek, 2010; Šimović & Batur, 2017), or certain dynamic 
analyses of fiscal sustainability (Babić et al., 2003; Sopek, 2011), and analyses that involve composite indicators (Mihaljek, 
2009; Cota & Žigman, 2011; Bajo & Primorac, 2013; Šimović & Batur, 2017). Almost all papers alert to mostly unsustainable 
projections of public debt level and fiscal policy in general. 
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For public debt sustainability analysis, annual data is used for period 2001-15. For empirical 
part of the paper, as well as for the empirical identification of the breakpoints and regime 
changes, quarterly data is used for same period as in previous analysis (2001:Q1-2015:Q4). 
Sources for all variables used in empirical part are Eurostat (National accounts, ESA 2010) 
and/or AMECO (2016). 
 
2. Public debt sustainability in Croatia 
 
There are many different approaches for measuring the public debt sustainability. Usually, the 
sustainability of public debt is observed through a broader framework called fiscal or public 
finances sustainability. Such analyses include three groups of indicators: fiscal vulnerability 
indicators, fiscal stability indicators and composite indicators2. For the purpose of this paper, 
only several indicators will be observed. Main aggregate indicators of the public debt, budget 
balance and interest payments will be observed as vulnerability indicators.3 Stability indicators 
of fiscal balance and interest rate needed to stabilize the public debt are analyzed as well as 
breakpoints and regime changes in the public debt trajectory. 
 
2.1. Public debt and fiscal balance dynamics 
 
Fiscal sustainability analyses in Croatia imply inadequate fiscal policy and public debt 
management (Šimović et al., 2014). Mentioned policies are proved to be particularly ineffective 
during the period of recession in Croatia, in which public debt has increased more than twice. 
In 2008 public debt was 39.6% of GDP and at the end of 2014 it amounted up to 86.5% of GDP. 
Figure 1 presents the public debt level in Croatia and EU average in 2001-15 period. Figure 




                                                                        
2 Composite (complex) indicators are omitted form this analysis. Most common composite (complex) indicators are credit 
rating, bond spreads and credit default swaps which contribute to observe current financial market assessment of observed 
county.  
3 Beside aggregate indicators like public debt level, or liquidity indicators like interest payments level, vulnerability indicators 
include analysis of maturity and currency risk 
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Figure 1 Public debt in Croatia and EU (% of GDP) 
 
Source: AMECO (2016). 
 
In the period before the recession there was a decreasing trend in the public debt to GDP ratio, 
while at the same time the amount of nominal debt was slightly increasing. In the pre-crisis 
period Croatia implemented a strategy of public borrowing on domestic markets which resulted 
in growth of internal debt more than the external. Since 2009, due to influence of the global 
economic and financial crisis, which generated decreased revenue and increased budget deficit, 
there has been a sudden increase of public debt and its part in GDP. Trend of increasing public 
debt was influenced mostly by the growth of total general government deficit. Apart from loss 
in tax revenues, growth of budget deficit was a result of inadequate adjustment of public 
expenditure and raising interests on the public debt. Figure 2 presents government budget 
balance in the period 2006-2015 and it is decomposed into primary balance and interest 
expenses. 
 
Figure 2 Total balance, primary balance and interest payments (% of GDP) 
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E F Z G  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S                                     1 7 - 0 5  
 
 Page 7 of 17 
 
Primary balance shows the connection between current expenditure and revenue, i.e. what 
would be the amount of budget deficit if interest expenses did not exist. Figure clearly shows 
that in the period of recession the government did not adjust primary balance. Moreover, due 
to raising principal and global interest rates there has been a dramatic increase of interest 
expenses which amounted to 3.56% of GDP by the end of 2015. 
 
Furthermore, budget deficit and public debt growth was largely contributed by a change in 
interest rates, the so called snowball effect. The effect arises from the interaction between 
differential cost of refinancing debt and economic growth on one hand, and the level of public 
debt on the other hand. Considering that in the time of recession the cost of (re)financing debt 
was raising, the level of public debt would have been unsustainable even if it the government 
had not generated (primary) budget deficit. In other words, public debt would have increased 
due to rising interest rates even if the government had been able to carry out fiscal adjustment 
and decrease budget deficit. 
 
2.2. Stability indicators 
 
Stability indicators of public debt and fiscal balance present values needed to stabilize public 
debt at previous year level. Main stability indicators are total balance (𝑏𝑡
∗), primary balance 
(𝑏𝑡
∗𝑝
) and interest rate (𝑟𝑡















𝑑𝑡−1       (2) 
𝑟𝑡




      (3) 
where 𝑔𝑡
𝑛 presents the nominal GDP growth rate, 𝑑𝑡 is the public debt-to-GDP ratio, 𝑖𝑡
𝑛 is the 
nominal interest rate, 𝑔𝑡 the real GDP growth rate and 𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 is the primary balance. 
 
Figure 3 presents total fiscal balance, primary balance and real interest rate needed to stabilize 
the public debt in Croatia in 2001-15 period.5 Results imply similar conclusions as previous 
sustainability analysis where the end of 2008 i.e. beginning of 2009 implies disruption in the 
fiscal stability and inverse relation between fiscal balances and interest rates needed to stabilize 
the public debt. 
 
  
                                                                        
4 Methodology is adjusted according to Hiebert & Rostagno (2000) and Mihaljek (2003).  
5 Results of all indicators of stability indicators are presented in Appendix 1 – Table A1.1.  
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Figure 3 Total balance, primary balance and real interest rate needed to stabilize the public 
debt 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
In the first regime, 2001-08 period, both total and primary balances needed to stabilize the debt 
were rather stable and had rather small negative values. After 2009, Croatia continuously needs 
fiscal (primary) surpluses to stabilize the debt level at previous year level. Due to numerous 
factors like political instability and huge social state (see Šimović, 2014), that goal was 
impossible to achieve. Instead, Croatia had excessive (total and primary) deficits which largely 
contributed to the instability and unsustainability of the public debt.  
 
Furthermore, Croatian credit rating and real interest rates development also did not contribute 
to the fiscal stability. Real interest rate needed to stabilize the debt reached negative values, 
which was also impossible goal to achieve. On the contrary, in the same period Croatian credit 
ratings dropped as real interest rates increased, so the interest payments and before mentioned 
snowball effect additionally contributed to the fiscal instability.  
 
Next part of the analysis includes a calculation of total fiscal effort (𝐹𝐸𝑡) needed to stabilize 
the public debt and real interest rate gap (𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑝) given in the following expressions:  
𝐹𝐸𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡
∗ − 𝑏𝑡       (4) 
𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑝 = 𝑟𝑡
∗ − 𝑟𝑡       (5) 
 
This part of analysis presents even more disappointing results regarding the stability issues after 
2009. Figure 4 presents the fiscal effort and the real interest rate gap needed to stabilize the 
public debt. Results again present inverse relation between the fiscal effort and the real interest 
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Figure 4 Fiscal effort (in % of GDP) and real interest rate gap (in pp) 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
The fiscal effort presents difference between realized general government balance and balance 
needed to stabilize the public debt. In 2009 Croatia should have had fiscal effort of 8% of GDP 
just to stabilize the public debt at 2008 level. Such effort could have been done by decreasing 
expenditures and/or increasing taxes. Due to political and economic circumstances, such goal 
was impossible to accomplish. After 2009, owing to certain fiscal consolidation efforts, a trend 
declined a bit. During recession period (2009-14) in Croatia, average fiscal effort needed to 
stabilize the debt was 6.45% of GDP. With economic recovery in 2015, again regime changes, 
there is more fiscal space in context of the public debt stability.  
 
The real interest rate gap presents difference between real interest rate needed to stabilize the 
debt and realized real interest rate. Again, 2009 saw the largest gap of 12.4 percentage points 
between the real interest rate realized (4.9%) and the one needed to stabilize debt (-7.5). 
 
2.3. Breakpoints and regime changes in the public debt trajectory 
 
Simple “eyeball metrics” suggests that the period of public debt unsustainability occurs parallel 
with economic crisis. Beforehand analysis based on annual data suggests that in 2009 major 
disruption occurs in fiscal stance and fiscal sustainability. Looking at quarterly data, the last 
quarter of 2008 can be observed as the main breakpoint in the public debt trajectory. However, 
for the purpose of empirical research and in order to make this analysis more robust, a formal, 
empirical, analysis of breakpoints in the public debt trajectory is conducted.  
 
Common approach in the breakpoint literature is to describe a trajectory of the variable of 
interest as an AR(1) process so as a starting point we define a following regression: 
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where c is a constant, 𝑑𝑡 is a debt-to-GDP ratio and 𝜀𝑡 is an error term. 
 
Based on the estimation of this regression, two multiple break tests are used: (i) Quandt-
Andrews and (ii) Bai-Perron test. The results of these tests are presented in Appendix 2 (Tables 
A2.1 and T2.2). Presented results are in line with before mentioned assumption as both tests 
indicate the last quarter of 2008 as the formal breakpoint in the public debt trajectory. In 
addition, interestingly, Bai-Perron indicates two more breaks, first in 2011Q2 when public debt 
in Croatia officially broke the 60% of GDP benchmark and 2013Q4 when we could see a 
gradual deceleration of the rise of debt-to-GDP ratio. However, in the rest of the analysis we 
will mainly focus on 2008Q4 as a most important breakpoint date. 
 
3. Effects of public debt level on fiscal policy effectiveness 
 
3.1. Switching regression approach 
 
As stated previously, 2008:Q4 can be seen as a (negative) turning point in the Croatian 
economy. After 2008:Q4, dynamics of the economic and fiscal system substantially changed. 
GDP growth rate decreased from average 4.3% in 2001-2008 to average -1.6% in 2009-2015. 
Debt-to-GDP ratio increased from average 38.6 % of GDP in 2001-2008 to average 71.2% of 
GDP in 2009-15. Again, by simply looking at data it is visible that Croatia went through two 
different economic regimes. Thus, to formally test this assumption and to see whether the 
regime changes have an effect on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, a regime-switching 
regression approach is used.  
 
The switching model assumes that there is a different regression model associated with each 
regime. Given regressors 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡, the conditional mean of dependent variable 𝑦𝑡 in regime m 
is assumed to be the linear specification: 
𝜇𝑡(𝑚) = 𝑋𝑡′𝛽𝑚 +  𝑍𝑡′𝛾      (7) 
where 𝛽𝑚 and 𝛾 are vectors of coefficients. Note that the 𝛽𝑚 coefficients for 𝑋𝑡 are indexed by 
regime and that the 𝛾 coefficients associated with 𝑍𝑡 are regime invariant. 
 
Lastly, it is assumed that the regression errors are normally distributed with variance that may 
depend on the regime. In that case the model is: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡(𝑚) + 𝜎(𝑚)𝜀𝑡.     (8) 
 
Our baseline model is defined as follows: 
𝑦?̇? =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔?̇? + 𝛽2𝑑?̇? + 𝛽3𝑓?̇? + 𝑦𝑡−1̇ + 𝜖𝑡   (9) 
where 𝑦𝑡, 𝑔𝑡, 𝑑𝑡 and 𝑓𝑡 represent annual change in real GDP, government consumption, debt-
to-GDP ratio and foreign demand6, respectively, while 𝑦𝑡−1 is a lagged dependent variable (to 
avoid problem of autocorrelation). Such structure of the model allows us to analyze the effects 
                                                                        
6 Foreign demand is introduced as an important control variable as Croatia is small open economy with high level of 
synchronization of the business cycle with the Eurozone. 
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of fiscal policy and debt-to-GDP ratio directly on the growth figure, but also to assess the 
interconnection among fiscal spending and debt. Regime switching regression results are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Results of the regime switching model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
Regime 1     
C 0.002331 0.015496 0.150424 0.8804 
G -0.014609 0.259704 -0.441305 0.6590 
F 1.741589 0.443133 3.930174 0.0001 
GDEBT -0.212218 0.108420 -1.957361 0.0503 
AR(1) 0.353556 0.203918 1.733813 0.0830 
Regime 2     
C 0.011061 0.014346 0.771047 0.4407 
G 1.085977 0.258152 4.206726 0.0000 
F 1.183918 0.491312 2.409708 0.0160 
GDEBT -0.357553 0.110556 -3.234143 0.0012 
AR(1) 0.904157 0.240194 3.764281 0.0002 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
According to results, model recognizes two regimes, coinciding with the change in the mean of 
the dependent variable between 2001-2008 and 2009-2015. In the first regime the effect of 
changes in government spending on economic growth was marginally negative but statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, changes in the debt indicator had a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the growth figure. In the second regime government spending became an 
important growth determinant, with statistically significant coefficient above 1 (approximation 
of the multiplier), in line with theoretical and empirical fact that fiscal policy (government 
expenditures) has a stronger effect on growth in recessions (see Auerbach & Gorodinchenko, 
2012). Change in debt ratio remained statistically significant but its negative effect strengthened 
with the rise of instability. Thus, it can be concluded that despite the fact that the fiscal spending 
effectiveness rises in recessions, related increase of the debt unsustainability mitigates the 
effects of anti-cyclical fiscal policy. 
 
3.2. SVAR approach 
 
To analyze the effects of fiscal policy on the economic activity the structural VAR (SVAR) 
model is used. Blanchard & Perotti (2002) identification method is often used as a benchmark 
for such analyses. The structural VAR approach predicts that a positive spending shock (deficit 
financed, i.e. leaving taxes unchanged) has a positive effect on output.7 The original Blanchard 
& Perotti (1999) model takes only three variables: government spending, net taxes and real 
GDP, which is often called closed model. Depending on structural characteristics of given 
economy, model can be extended by introducing variables that present different determinants 
                                                                        
7 Also, a positive tax shock (leaving government spending unaffected) has a negative effect on output.  
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which can affect fiscal policy effectiveness (trade openness, labor market rigidness, exchange 
rate regime, level of public debt etc.).8  
 
Analysis starts with a three-variable (closed) model: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + +𝐷𝑡  + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 .   (10) 
 
Following Blanchard & Perotti (2002) vector 𝑋𝑡 = [𝑇𝑡, 𝐺𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡]’ includes deflated and 
seasonally adjusted log-values of net indirect tax revenue (𝑇𝑡) total general government 
spending (𝐺𝑡) and domestic demand (𝐷𝐷𝑡). Exogenous variables included in the model are 
constant (α), time trend (It) and a dummy variable (Dt) which represents structural breakpoint 
of fiscal unsustainability and takes a value of 1 in 2008:Q4. Vector It includes long-term trends 
of corresponding variables.9 Finally, vector ut = [t, g, dd]′ represents the vector of innovations 
of the reduced model (RF), ut~(0, ∑u). Time lags are set according to AIC and SIC criteria. In 
the second step, for purpose of this paper, mentioned closed model is extended by including the 
fourth endogenous variable (public debt) in model (10). Identification scheme follows 
Blanchard & Perotti (2002) approach for closed model and Deskar-Škrbić & Šimović (2017) 
approach for extended model. Model specification details are available in Deskar-Škrbić & 
Šimović (2017). Because of listing length, stability, serial correlation, normality and 
heteroskedasticity tests are available upon request. 
 
Figure 5 Impulse responses  
 
Note: dotted lines represent 68% confidence indicator 
Source: author’s calculations. 
                                                                        
8 For example, Ravn & Spange (2012) extended model for Denmark by introducing variables that represent external (foreign) 
demand shocks. Similar was done for Croatia by Deskar-Škrbić et al. (2014).  
9 It is assumed that long term trends of corresponding variables have no influence on the long term trends of other variables. 
This assumption is compatible with view that fiscal policy has no long run effects on the economy. Focus of this analysis is on 
the effectiveness of public spending in steering short term fluctuations. To capture the effects of this cyclical interdependence 
between fiscal shocks and economic activity we use HP filter to de-trend all of the variables and proceed our analysis on the 
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Figure 5 presents the impulse response functions based on the SVAR model presented 
previously. It can be seen that the effects of discretionary government spending shock in the 
closed model is positive and statistically significant in the first eight quarters after the shock. 
On the other hand, in the extended model with the debt-to-GDP indicators, fiscal shocks have 
a positive but milder statistically significant effect on economic growth in the second and third 
quarter, while this effect turns to negative and statistically significant impact in the eight 
quarter. To get a clearer view on the size of fiscal impact on economic growth, in Table 2 we 
present the IRF coefficients (fiscal multipliers) in the first and the second year after the shock. 
 
Table 2 Multiplier effects of structural fiscal spending shock on domestic demand  
 Closed model Extended model with public 
debt 
4th quarter 1.14 0.63 
8th quarter 0.45 -0.40 
Note: the effects are statistically significant 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
According to results, in the first year after the shock fiscal impact in the closed model is almost 
twice the size of the fiscal impact in the extended model with public debt. In the second year 
first model indicates milder, but positive multipliers, while second model shows negative 
multipliers. Based on the impulse response analysis, it seems that public debt posts limitations 




The period 2001-2015 in Croatia was followed by changes in regimes regarding the public debt 
level and the fiscal policy influence. Growing public debt and fiscal unsteadiness were 
progressing from 2009, i.e. last quarter of 2008, due to beginning of a long economic and 
financial crisis. By the end of 2015 the level of public debt was 86.7% of GDP, which was 
significantly higher than The Maastricht criteria of 60% of GDP. The analysis of the public 
debt sustainability in Croatia has shown that public debt was mainly sustainable until 2008 i.e. 
unsustainable after 2009 with exemption of 2015. Analysis of the sustainability indicators has 
shown that total budget deficit, primary deficit and real interest rates are still too high and that 
there is still a great difference between achieved and stabilizing levels. Therefore, further fiscal 
efforts are required in order to reach sustainable levels and thus stabilize the public debt. 
Furthermore, the fiscal sustainability analysis shows high public finance vulnerability in 
Croatia. The level of public debt did not contribute to this as much as the perceived liquidity 
risk connected with high interest dues. It can be concluded that the fiscal unsustainability i.e. 
the growth of public debt was equally influenced by negative economic trends and the lack of 
fiscal adjustment, as it was by worsening in financing terms and the increase of interest rates in 
the period of recession.  
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Empirical results confirm thesis that public debt level significantly affects and reduces the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. Regime switching model proved the importance of public debt in 
both regimes. Despite the fact that fiscal spending effectiveness rises in recessions, related 
increase of debt unsustainability mitigates the effects of possible anti-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Extended SVAR model with public debt, compared to the closed economy model, clearly 
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Appendix 1 Indicators of public debt stability 
 
Table A1.1 Total balance, primary balance and real interest rate needed to stabilize the public debt 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1. Public debt (% of GDP) 36,5 36,6 38,1 40,4 41,3 38,9 37,7 39,6 49,0 58,3 65,2 70,7 82,2 86,5 86,7 
2. Nominal GDP (yoy, %) 7,8 8,9 9,8 8,0 7,7 9,0 9,5 7,9 -4,8 -0,9 1,4 -0,6 -0,3 -0,3 1,8 
3. Real GDP (yoy, %) 3,4 5,2 5,6 4,1 4,2 4,8 5,2 2,1 -7,4 -1,7 -0,3 -2,2 -1,1 -0,4 1,6 
4. General government balance (% of GDP) -2,1 -3,5 -4,7 -5,2 -3,9 -3,4 -2,4 -2,8 -6,0 -6,2 -7,8 -5,3 -5,3 -5,5 -3,2 
5. Total balance needed to stabilize the public debt -2,6 -3,0 -3,3 -2,8 -2,9 -3,4 -3,4 -2,8 2,0 0,4 -0,8 0,4 0,2 0,3 -1,5 
6. Total fiscal effort (% of GDP) -0,5 0,5 1,4 2,4 1,0 0,0 -0,9 0,0 8,0 6,6 7,0 5,7 5,5 5,8 1,7 
7. Interest payments (% of GDP) 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,3 2,6 3,0 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,6 
8. Nominal interest rate (%) 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,4 5,5 4,4 4,9 6,0 7,8 6,3 6,5 6,1 4,7 4,1 3,6 
9. Primary balance (% of GDP) -0,3 -1,7 -2,9 -3,3 -1,9 -1,5 -0,6 -0,8 -3,7 -3,6 -4,8 -1,9 -1,8 -2,0 0,4 
10. Primary balance needed to stabilize the public 
debt (%) 
-0,7 -1,1 -1,4 -0,9 -0,8 -1,7 -1,6 -0,6 5,3 3,5 3,0 4,4 3,5 3,6 1,5 
11. Real interest rate (%) 2,8 2,0 1,6 1,6 2,0 0,4 0,8 0,3 4,9 5,4 4,8 4,5 3,8 4,0 3,4 
12. Real interest rate needed to stabilize the public 
debt (%) 
3,4 5,2 5,5 4,0 4,1 4,7 5,1 2,0 -7,5 -1,8 -0,4 -2,2 -1,1 -0,4 1,6 
13. Real interest rate gap  0,6 3,2 3,9 2,4 2,1 4,3 4,3 1,7 -12,4 -7,2 -5,2 -6,7 -4,9 -4,4 -1,8 
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Appendix 2 Results of breakpoint tests 
 
Table A2.1 Quandt-Andrews test 
Statistic Value Prob. 
Maximum LR F-statistic (2008Q4) 16.90209 0.0000 
Maximum Wald F-statistic (2008Q4) 33.80417 0.0000 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
Table A2.2 Bai-Perron test 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks:  2 
LWZ criterion selected breaks:  1 
Breaks # of Coefs. 







0 2 126.2874 -100.9004 0.976948 1.068870 
1 5 75.94741 -86.91609 0.687011 0.919523 
2 8 59.53235 -80.21925 0.662071 1.038780 
3 11 52.98193 -77.01361 0.764084 1.289071 
* Minimum information criterion values displayed with shading 
Estimated break dates: 
1:  2008Q4 
2:  2008Q4,  2013Q4 
3:  2008Q4,  2011Q2,  2013Q4 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
